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Abstract: This paper implements a structural model of the yield curve with data on nominal positions and 
survey forecasts. Bond prices are characterized in terms of investors’ current portfolio holdings as well as 
their subjective beliefs about future bond payoffs. Risk premia measured by an econometrician vary 
because of changes in investors’ subjective risk premia that are identified from portfolios and subjective 
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investors’ systematic forecast errors are an important source of business cycle variation in measured risk 
premia. By contrast, subjective risk premia move less and more slowly over time. 
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curve I Introduction
There is a large literature that tries to understand the dynamics of the yield curve through the
behavior of optimizing investors. For example, consumption-based asset pricing models start from
the fact that, when investors optimize, bond prices can be expressed in terms of investors’ beliefs
about future asset values and consumption. Model-implied bond prices then consist of expected
discounted future bond payoﬀs, minus a risk premium that depends on the covariance of future
bond returns with consumption. Empirical implementation of this idea requires the modeler to
postulate a probability distribution that represents investor beliefs. In practice, this distribution
is typically supplied by a stochastic process of asset values and consumption, often constrained by
cross- equation restrictions implied by the economic model.
This paper proposes an alternative approach to implement a structural model of the yield
curve. We start from the fact that, when investors optimize, the prices of bonds can be expressed
in terms of the distribution of their future payoﬀs together with current realized investor asset
positions. We construct measures of both objects, using survey expectations of yields as well as
data on outstanding nominal assets in the US economy. Model-implied bond prices again depend
on expected payoﬀs minus risk premia, where the latter are identiﬁed from beliefs and portfolio
holdings.
Our model allows for three sources of time variation in expected excess bond returns measured
by an econometrician. First, there is time variation in the subjective volatility of investors’ con-
sumption growth (or their return on wealth), which we identify from portfolio data. Second, there
is time variation in the conditional covariance of bond returns with investors’ continuation utility
(or “investment opportunities”), a property of investors’ subjective belief. Finally, risk premia
measured by an econometrician can vary over time if investors’ subjective beliefs do not agree with
those of the econometrician. The main result of this paper is that, at least in the model we consider,
this third source of time variation in measured expected excess returns is the most important one.
We consider a group of investors who share the same Epstein-Zin preferences and hold the
same subjective beliefs about future asset payoﬀs. Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First,
we estimate investors’ beliefs about future asset values, combining statistical analysis and survey
2forecast evidence. Second, we produce a measure of investor asset positions, using quantity data
from the Flow of Funds accounts and the CRSP Treasury database. Third, we work out investors’
savings and portfolio choice problem given beliefs to derive asset demand, for every period in
our sample. Finally, we ﬁnd equilibrium asset prices by setting asset demand equal to investors’
observed asset holdings in the data. We thus arrive at a sequence of model-implied bond prices of
the same length as the sample. The model is “successful” if the sequence of model-implied prices
is close to actual prices.
In the ﬁrst step, we document properties of survey forecasts of interest rates over the last
four decades. Here we combine evidence from the Blue Chip survey, available since 1982, and its
precursor, the Goldsmith-Nagan survey, available since 1970. We compare expected excess returns
on bonds implied by predictability regressions that are common in the literature to expected excess
returns on bonds perceived by the median survey investor. The main stylized fact from this exercise
is that subjective expected excess returns are smaller on average and less countercyclical than
conventional measures of expected excess returns. The reason is that predictability regressions
do a good job forecasting interest rate drops in recessions, whereas survey forecasters do not.
During and after recessions, conventionally measured expected returns thus appear much higher
than survey expected excess returns.
To construct investor beliefs that can serve as an input to our asset pricing model, we ﬁrst
estimate a time series model of macro variables and interest rates that nests an aﬃne term structure
model. We then assume that investors’ subjective belief has the same basic structure and use survey
forecast data to estimate the parameters of the Radon-Nikodym derivative of investors’ belief with
respect to our own “objective” model. We thus obtain a subjective time series model that nests
a subjective aﬃne term structure model. The subjective term-structure model has smaller and
less variable market prices of risk than its objective counterpart, and does a good job capturing
diﬀerences in the cyclical properties of subjective and objective expected excess returns.
Since there is a large variety of nominal instruments, an investor’s “bond position” is in principle
a high-dimensional object. To address this issue, the second step of the analysis uses the subjective
term-structure model to replicate positions in many common nominal instruments by portfolios
that consist of only three zero coupon bonds. Three bonds work because a two-factor model does
3a good job describing quarterly movements in the nominal term structure. We use the replicating
portfolios to illustrate properties of bonds outstanding in the US credit market. One interesting
fact is that the relative supply of longer bonds declined before 1980, as interest rate spreads were
falling, but saw a dramatic increase in the 1980s, a time when spreads were extraordinarily high.
We illustrate our asset pricing approach by presenting an exercise where investors are assumed to
be “rentiers”, that is, they hold only bonds. Rentiers’ bond portfolios are taken to be proportional
to those of the aggregate US household sector, and we choose preference parameters to best match
the mean yield curve. This leads us to consider relatively patient investors with low risk aversion.
Our model then allows a decomposition of “objective” risk premia as measured under the objective
statistical model of yields into their three sources of time variation. We ﬁnd that subjective risk
premia are small and vary only at low frequencies. This is because both measured bond positions,
and the hedging demand for long bonds under investors’ subjective belief move slowly over time.
In contrast, the diﬀerence in subjective and objective forecasts is a source of large time variation
in risk premia at business cycle frequencies.
This paper shares the goal of the consumption-based asset pricing literature: to ﬁnd a model
of investor behavior that helps us understand why some bonds have higher returns than others.
Indeed, the preferences explored here are the same as in Piazzesi and Schneider (2006; PS). The
present paper diﬀers from PS as well as other studies in that it does not claim to directly measure
the dynamics of planned consumption. Instead, it only measures beliefs about future asset payoﬀs.
Quantity data enter only in the form of realized asset positions and realized consumption. A second
diﬀerence is that PS, again following a large literature, restrict beliefs about consumption, inﬂation,
and yields by assuming that agents use the structure of the model itself when forming beliefs.
These diﬀerences in approach are minor if consumption is observable and all beliefs are derived
from a single stationary probability distribution which also governs the data. Indeed, if the sta-
tionary rational-expectations version of the model studied in PS is correct, then the benchmark
household sector exercise of this paper will ﬁnd that model-implied yields have the same properties
as yields in the data.1 A mismatch of model-implied and actual yields would thus indicate that the
1Indeed, suppose that the stationary rational expectations version of PS is the “truth” that generated the data.
Consider now our benchmark household sector exercise, with beliefs deﬁned as conditionals from a stationary statisti-
cal model of asset values. With a long enough sample, returns under the estimated model will be the same as returns
4stationary rational expectations version of PS does not ﬁt the data. The approach of this paper can
therefore be viewed as an alternative strategy to evaluate stationary rational expectations models.
More generally, the approach of this paper can be used to evaluate models when the rational
expectations assumption is not imposed. Our approach has three properties that are particularly
helpful in this case. First, it does not assume that agents use the structure of the model to form
beliefs. It thus allows for the possibility that a model with recursive preferences is a good model of
the risk-return tradeoﬀ faced by investors, but not a good model of belief formation. Second, since
beliefs about payoﬀs are taken as an input to the exercises, we can make use of survey forecasts to
discipline the model. Third, since beliefs about planned consumption are not needed, we can derive
some pricing implications even when consumption is not observable, as long as we can observe
portfolio positions. We make use of this property when we set up the “rentier” exercise.
Related Literature — to be written.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the model. Section III
describes properties of subjective beliefs measured from surveys. Section IV describes how we
model subjective beliefs and estimate them with survey data. Section V explains how we replicate
nominal position s by simple portfolios. Section VI reports the asset pricing results.
II Model
A large number of identical investors live forever. Their preferences over consumption plans are
represented by Epstein-Zin utility with unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The utility
ut of a consumption plan (Cτ)
∞
τ=t solves





under the true PS model. The exercise now derives a sequence of prices from a sequence of optimality conditions.
By construction, every such condition also holds under the PS model, where agents solve the same portfolio choice
problem. It follows that the statistical properties of the model-implied prices are the same as under the true PS
model. Moreover, the distribution of planned consumption would be the same as the distribution of consumption in
the data.
5Investors’ ranking of certain consumption streams is thus given by discounted logarithmic utility.
At the same time, their attitude towards atemporal lotteries is determined by the risk aversion
coeﬃcient γ. We focus below on the case γ>1, which implies an aversion to persistent risks (as
discussed in Piazzesi and Schneider 2006).
Investors have access to two types of assets. Bonds are nominal instruments that promise
dollar-denominated payoﬀs in the future. In particular, there is a one period bond — from now on,
the short bond — that pays oﬀ one dollar at date t +1 ;i tt r a d e sa td a t et at a price e−it.I t sr e a l
payoﬀ is e−πt+1,w h e r eπt is (log) inﬂation.2 In some of our exercises, we also allow investors to
trade a residual asset, which stands in for all assets other than bonds. The log real return from
date t to date t+1is rres
t+1, so that its excess return over the short bond is xres
t+1 = rres
t+1 −it −πt+1.
In addition to short bonds, investors can buy N other zero-coupon bonds, which–together
with the short bond–we refer to as spanning bonds. We collect the log nominal prices of these
bonds at date t in a vector ˆ pt, and we collect their log nominal payoﬀs3 at date t +1in a vector
ˆ p+1
t+1. The log excess returns over the short bond from date t to date t +1can thus be written
as ˆ xt+1 =ˆ p+1
t+1 − ˆ pt − it. Below, the number of long bonds N will correspond to the number of
factors in our term structure model: our empirical implementation will use the fact that, under an
N-factor model, N +1bonds are suﬃcient to span the payoﬀs on all bonds.
Investors start a trading period t with initial wealth Wt. They decide how to split this initial
wealth into consumption as well as investment in the N +2assets. We denote by αres
t the portfolio
weight on the residual asset (that is, the fraction of savings invested in that asset), and we collect
the portfolio weights on all bonds other than the short bond in a vector ˆ αt. The household’s
2This is a simple way to capture that the short (1 period) bond is denominated in dollars. To see why, consider
a nominal bond which costs P
(1)
t dollars today and pays of $1 tomorrow, or 1/p
c
t+1 units of numeraire consumption.
Now consider a portfolio of p
c
t nominal bonds. The price of the portfolio is P
(1)





t+1 =1 /πt+1 units of numeraire tomorrow. The model thus determines the price P
(1)
t of a nominal bond in $.
3This notation is convenient to accomodate the fact that the maturity of zero-coupon bonds changes from one
date to the next. For example, assume that there is only one long bond, of maturity n,a n dl e ti
(n)
t denote its yield
to maturity. The long bond trades at date t at a log price ˆ pt = −ni
(n)
t , and it promises a log payoﬀ at date t +1of
ˆ p
+1
t+1 = −(n − 1)i
(n−1)
t+1 .
6sequence of budget constraints can then be written as4
¯ Wτ+1 = Rw
τ+1











; τ ≥ t. (2)
The household problem at date t is to maximize utility (1) subject to (2), given initial wealth ¯ Wt
as well as beliefs about returns. Beliefs about returns are based on current bond prices ˆ pt,t h e
current short rate it, as well as the conditional distribution of the vector
¡
rres




that is, the return on the residual asset, the short interest rate, the inﬂation rate and the prices
and payoﬀs on the long spanning bonds. We denote this conditional distribution by Gt.
We now relate bond prices to positions and expectations using investors’ optimal policy func-
tions. Since preferences are homothetic and all assets are tradable, optimal consumption and
investment plans are proportional to initial wealth. The optimal portfolio weights on long bonds
and the residual asset thus depend only on beliefs about returns and can be written as ˆ αt (it, ˆ pt,G t)
and αres
t (it,p t,G t), respectively. Moreover, with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one,
the optimal consumption rule is Ct =( 1− β) ¯ Wt. Now suppose we observe investors’ bond posi-
tions: we write Bt for the total dollar amount invested in bonds at date t, and we collect investors’
holdings of the two long bonds in the vector b Bt.
We perform two types of exercises. Consider ﬁrst a class of investors who invest only in bonds;
there is no residual asset. We must then have




These equations can be solved for long bond prices ˆ pt as a function of the short rate it, bond
positions (Bt, ˆ Bt) and expectations Gt. We can thus characterize yield spreads in terms of these
variables.




ˆ xt is an N-vector with the jth element equal to e
ˆ xt,j.
7we must have













These equations can be solved for long bond prices ˆ pt and the short rate it, as a function of bond
positions (Bt, ˆ Bt),c o n s u m p t i o nCt and expectations Gt. This characterizes both short and long
yields in terms of positions and expectations.
Portfolio choice when beliefs are driven by a normal VAR
We now restrict beliefs to obtain tractable approximate formulas for investors’ portfolio poli-
cies. Let zt denote a vector of exogenous state variables that follows a vector autoregression with
homoskedastic normally distributed shocks. We assume that log short interest rates it and log
inﬂation πt are linear functions of zt and that log excess returns xt =( xres
t , ˆ x0
t)
0 are linear functions
of zt and zt−1. Households’ belief about future returns, interest rates and inﬂation at date t is
now deﬁned as the conditional implied by the VAR. As a result, the state vector for the household
problem is
¡ ¯ Wt,z t
¢
.
We use the approximation method proposed by Campbell, Chan and Viceira (2003). The basic
idea is that the log return on a portfolio in a discrete time problem is well approximated by a
discretized version of its continuous-time counterpart. In our setup, the log return on wealth is
approximated by
(5) logRw





t (diag(Σxx) − Σxxαt),
where Σxx is the one-step-ahead conditional covariance matrix of excess returns xt+1,a n dαt denotes
the vector of portfolio weights
¡
αres




If this approximation is used for the return on wealth, the investor’s value function can be
written as vt
¡ ¯ Wt,z t
¢
=l o g¯ Wt +˜ vt,w h e r e˜ vt is linear-quadratic in the state vector zt.M o r e o v e r ,



























xxcovt (xt+1, ˜ vt+1).
If γ =1— the case of separable logarithmic utility — the household behaves “myopically”, that
is, the portfolio composition depends only on the one-step-ahead distribution of returns. More
generally, the ﬁrst line in (6) represents the myopic demand of an investor with one-period horizon
and risk aversion coeﬃcient γ. To obtain intuition, consider the case of independent returns, so
that Σxx is diagonal. The ﬁrst term then says that the myopic investor puts more weight on assets
with high expected returns and low variance, and more so when risk aversion is lower. The second
term says that, if γ>1, the investor also likes assets that provide insurance against inﬂation, and
buys more such insurance assets if risk aversion is higher. For general Σxx, these statements must
be modiﬁed to take into account correlation patterns among the individual assets.
For a long-lived household with γ 6=1 , asset demand also depends on the covariance of excess
returns and future continuation utility ˜ v(zt+1). Continuation utility is driven by changes in in-
vestment opportunities: a realization of zt+1 that increases ˜ v is one that signals high returns on
wealth (“good investment opportunities”) in the future. Agents with γ>1 prefer relatively more
asset payoﬀ in states of the world where investment opportunities are bad. As a result, an asset
that pays oﬀ when investment opportunities are bad is attractive for a high-γ agent. He will thus
demand more of it than a myopic agent.
Explicit price formulas
Consider the case without a residual asset. Using the portfolio policy (6), equation (3) can be
rearranged to provide an explicit formula for long bond prices:




−γΣˆ xˆ x b Bt/Bt +( γ − 1)covt (ˆ xt+1,πt+1) − (γ − 1)covt (ˆ xt+1,˜ vt+1). (7)
The ﬁrst line is (log) discounted expected future price, where the variance term appears because
9of Jensen’s inequality. The second line is the risk premium, which consists of three parts. The ﬁrst
is proportional to Σˆ xˆ x b Bt/Bt, the covariance of excess returns with the excess return on wealth
ˆ x>
t+1 b Bt/Bt. In the case of log utility (γ =1 )this covariance represents the entire risk premium.
More generally, a higher risk aversion coeﬃcient drives up the compensation required for covariance
with the return on wealth.5 The second term is an inﬂa t i o nr i s kp r e m i u m .F o rγ>1, this premium
is negative: households have to be compensated less to hold an asset that provides insurance against
inﬂation. Finally, the third term is a premium for covariance with future investment opportunities.
An asset that insures households against bad future investment opportunities — by paying oﬀ less
when continuation utility ˜ vt+1 is high — commands a lower premium.





t /Ct,1 − Bt/Ct
´
denote the investor’s wealth portfolio. Using equation (6), we can
rearrange (4) as































where δ = β−1 − 1. The risk premium on long bonds now also depends on the covariance between
excess bond returns and the excess return on the residual asset (through the expression Σˆ xxαW
t ).
The short rate depends on moments of the residual assets as well as expected inﬂation. Expectations
about the real return on the residual asset and the perceived risk premium on that asset ﬁxt h e
real interest rate.
If the risk premium is constant, a version of the expectations hypothesis holds: on average up
to a constant, buying a long bond at t and holding it to maturity should cost the same as buying
a short bond at t, earning interest it on it and then buying the long bond only at t +1 .O u r
model distinguishes three reasons for changes in risk premia. First, since the composition of wealth
changes over time, for example with changes in the relative amount of diﬀerent bonds in ˆ Bt,t h e r e
5Since consumption is proportional to savings, or wealth, the ﬁrst term in the risk premium also represents the
covariance of returns with consumption growth, multiplied by risk aversion.
10can be time variation in risk premia. Second, the strength of hedging demand may vary over time.
For our numerical results below, the function ˜ v will be approximately linear-quadratic in zt+1,a n d
so the need for insurance against bad states will indeed vary over time. Third, investors may have
expectations of future prices that are not rational. This implies that even if their subjective risk
premia are constant, the modeler may be able to predict excess returns on long bonds with some
variable known at time t. This predictability reﬂects the systematic forecast errors by investors.
III Survey forecasts
We measure subjective expectations of interest rates with survey data from two sources. Both
sources conduct comparable surveys that ask approximately 40 ﬁnancial market professionals for
their interest-rate expectations at the end of each quarter and record the median survey response.
Our ﬁrst source are the Goldsmith-Nagan surveys that were started in mid-1969 and continued until
the end of 1986. These surveys ask participants about their one-quarter ahead and two-quarter
ahead expectations of various interest rates, including the 3-month Treasury bill, the 12-month
Treasury bill rate, and a mortgage rate. Our second source are Bluechip Financial Forecasts, a
survey that was started in 1983 and continues until today. This survey asks participants for a
wider range of expectation horizons (from one to six quarters ahead) and about a larger set of
interest rates. The most recent surveys always include 3-month, 6-month and 1-year Treasury bills,
the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year Treasury bonds, and a mortgage rate.6
Deviations of subjective expectations from objective expectations of interest rates have conse-
quences for expected excess returns on bonds. We deﬁne the (log) excess return on an n-period











6The survey questions ask for constant-maturity Treasury yield expectations. To construct zero-coupon yield
expectations implied by the surveys, we use the following approximation. We compute the expected change in the
n-year constant-maturity yield. We then add the expected change to the current n-year zero-coupon yield.





















































objective premium = subjective premium + subj. - obj. interest-rate expectation
This expression shows that, if subjective expectations E∗ of interest rates deviate from their objec-
tive expectations E, the objective premium is diﬀerent from the subjective premium. In particular,
if the diﬀerence between objective and subjective beliefs changes in systematic ways over time, the
objective premium may change over time even if the subjective premium is constant.















, we estimate unrestricted VAR dynamics for a vector of interest rates
with quarterly data over the sample 1952:2-2007:1 and compute their implied forecasts. Later, in
Section IV, we will impose more structure on the VAR by assuming the absence of arbitrage and
using a lower number of variables in the VAR, and thereby check the robustness of the empirical
ﬁndings we document here. The vector of interest rates Y includes the 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 4-year,
5-year, 10-year and 20-year zero-coupon yields. We use data on nominal zero-coupon bond yields
with longer maturities from the McCulloch ﬁle available from the website http://www.econ.ohio-
state.edu/jhm/ts/mcckwon/mccull.htm. The sample for these data is 1952:2 - 1990:4. We augment
these data with the new Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) data. We compute the forecasts by
running OLS directly on the system Yt+h = μ+φYt +ut+h, so that we can compute the h−horizon
forecast simply as μ + φYt.
Figure 1 plots the left-hand side of equation (9), expected excess returns under objective beliefs
as a black line, and the second term on the right-hand side of the equation, the diﬀerence between
subjective and objective interest-rate expectations, as a gray line. For the short post-1983 sample
for which we have Bluechip data, we have data for many maturities n and many forecasting horizons
h. The lower two panels of Figure 1 use maturities n = 3 years and 11 years and a horizon of h =1
year, so that we deal with expectations of the n − h = 2 year and 10 year interest rate. These
12combinations of n and h are in the Bluechip survey, and the VAR includes these two maturities as
well so that the computation of objective expectations is easy. For the long post-1970 sample, we
need to combine data from the Goldsmith-Nagan and Bluechip surveys. The upper left panel shows
the n =1 .5 year bond and h = 6 month holding period. from the estimated VAR (which includes
the n−h =1year yield.) This works, because both surveys include the n−h =1year interest rate
and a h = 6-month horizon. The VAR delivers an objective 6-month ahead expectation of the 1-
year interest rate. For long bonds, we do not have consistent survey data over this long sample. To
get a rough idea of long-rate expectations during the Great Inﬂation, we take the Goldsmith-Nagan
data on expected mortgage-rate changes and the Bluechip data on expected 30-year Treasury-yield
over the next h = 2 quarters and add them to the current 20-year zero-coupon yield. The VAR
produces a h = 2 quarter ahead forecast of the 20-year yield.
Figure 1 also shows NBER recessions as shaded areas. The plots indicate that expected excess
returns under objective beliefs and the diﬀerence between subjective and objective interest-rate
expectations have common business-cycle movements. The patterns appear more clearly in the
lower panels which use longer (1 year) horizons. This is not surprising in light of the existing
predictability literature which documents that expected excess returns on bonds and other assets
are countercyclical when we look at longer holding periods, such as one year (e.g., Cochrane and
Piazzesi 2005.) In particular, expected excess returns are high right after recession troughs. The
lower panels show indeed high values for both series around and after the 1991 and 2001 recessions.
The series are also high in 1984 and 1996, which are years of slower growth (as indicated, for
example, by employment numbers) although they were not classiﬁed as recessions. For shorter
holding periods, the patterns are also there in the data but they are much weaker. However, the
upper panels show additional recessions where similar patterns appear. For example, the two series
in both panels are high in the 1970, 1974, 1980 and 1982 recessions or shortly afterwards.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of subjective beliefs measured from surveys. During the short
Bluechip sample, the average diﬀerence between realized interest rates and their one-quarter ahead
subjective expectation is negative for short maturities and close to zero, or slightly positive for
longer maturities. The average forecast error is −15 b a s i sp o i n t sf o rt h e3 - q u a r t e ri n t e r e s tr a t e
and −45 basis points for the 6-quarter interest rates. These two mean errors are the only ones































Long sample, n = 20.5 years, h = 6 months
























Short sample, n = 11 years, h = 1 year
Figure 1: Each panel shows objective expectations of excess returns in black (the left-hand side
of equation (9)) and the diﬀerence between subjective and objective interest-rate expectations in
gray (the second term on the right-hand side of the equation) for the indicated bond maturity n
and holding period/forecast horizon h. Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. The numbers are
annualized and in percent. The upper panels show data over a longer sample than the lower panels.
that are statistically signiﬁcant, considering the sample size of 98 quarters (which means that the
ratio of mean to standard deviation needs to be multiplied by roughly 10 to arrive at the relevant
t-statistic.) There is stronger evidence of bias at the 1-year horizon, where on average subjective
interest-rate expectations are above subsequent realizations for all maturities. During the long
combined Goldsmith-Nagan and Bluechip sample, the average 2-quarter ahead forecast errors are
−54 and −27 basis points for the 3-month and 1-year yields. The average 1-quarter forecast errors
are also negative for these maturities. The column for the 30 year yield in Table 1 includes the
14average forecast errors for the constructed long bond. The roughly 10 bp errors for this long interest
rate needs to be viewed with some caution due to how we constructed the survey series for this
bond (as explained earlier.)
Table 1: Subjective Biases And Objective Bond Premia
horizon maturity n
subj. bias h 3q t r 6q t r 1y e a r 2y e a r 3y e a r 5y e a r 7y e a r 1 0y e a r 3 0y e a r
Short Bluechip sample 1983:1 - 2007:1
average 1 qrt -0.15 -0.45 -0.15 -0.11 -0.07 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.01
1 year -0.57 -0.86 -0.56 -0.52 -0.47 -0.38 -0.32 -0.24 -0.30
std 1 qrt 0.57 0.83 0.79 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.67 0.60
1 year 1.41 1.64 1.66 1.55 1.47 1.35 1.28 1.22 1.12
Long Combined Goldsmith-Nagan and Bluechip Sample 1970:1-2007:1
average 1 qrt -0.10 -0.02 0.11
2 qrt -0.54 -0.27 0.10
stdev 1 qrt 1.32 1.86 0.66
2 qrt 1.78 2.29 0.89
obj. premium 1 year 0.39 0.57 0.76 0.85 0.83 -0.31









for the indicated horizon h and maturity n. The data are quarterly
Bluechip Financial Forecasts from 1983:1-2007:1, 98 quarters. The numbers are annualized









t for the indicated holding period h and maturity n.T h eq u a r t e r l y
zero-coupon yield data for the years 1952:2 - 1990:4 are from the McCulloch ﬁles and for the
years 1991:1-2007:1 from the new Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) dataset. The numbers
are annualized and in percent.
The upward bias in subjective expectations may partly explain why we observe positive average
excess returns on bonds. The right-hand side of equation (9) shows why: if objective expectations













on average, which raises the value of the left-hand side
of the equation. The magnitude of the bias is also economically signiﬁcant. For example, the −56
basis-point bias in subjective expectations of the 1-year interest rate can easily account for the 39
basis-point objective premium of the 2-year bond. For higher maturities, we need to multiply the
subjective bias by n−1 as in equation (9). For example, the −52 basis point bias in 2-year interest
rate expectations multiplied by n − h =2more than accounts for the 57 basis point objective
premium.
When we match up these numbers, it is important to keep in mind that subjective biases and
objective premia are measured imprecisely, because they are computed with small data samples.
In particular, over most of the Bluechip sample, interest rates were declining.
To sum up, the evidence presented in this section suggests that subjective interest-rate expec-
tations deviate from the objective expectations that we commonly measure from statistical models.
Table 1 suggests that these deviations may account for average objective premia. Figure 1 suggest
that these deviations may also be responsible for the time-variation in objective bond premia.
IV Modeling investor beliefs
The previous section has documented some properties of survey forecasts of interest rates. In order
to implement our asset pricing model, we need investors’ subjective conditional distributions over
future asset returns. Subsection A. describes a general setup to construct such distributions. In
subsection B., we report estimation results for a speciﬁcm o d e lo fb e l i e f s .
A. Setup
The basic idea is to start from an objective probability, provided by a statistical model of macro
variables and yields that ﬁts the data well from our (the modelers’) perspective. A second step then
uses survey forecasts to estimate the Radon-Nikodym derivative of investors’ subjective probability,
denoted P∗, with respect to the objective probability P.
16Objective probabilities
In order to choose portfolios, investors in our model form beliefs about interest rates, inﬂation,
and possibly the return on a residual asset. We describe the joint distribution of these variables by
a large state space system that nests in particular an aﬃne term structure model for yields. Let ht
denote an S-vector of observables that includes all relevant macro variables, and may also include
some interest rates. As before, let i
(n)
t denote the yield to maturity on an n-period zero coupon
bond. We represent the joint distribution of ht and interest rates under the objective probability
P by
ht = μ + ηhst−1 + et (10)
st = φsst−1 + σset, (11)
ft = ηfst (12)
i
(n)
t = an + b0
nft,n =1 ,2,.... (13)
Here st and et are S-vectors of state variables and i.i.d. zero-mean normal shocks with Eete0
t = Ω,
respectively. Moreover, ft is an F-vector of term-structure factors which are in turn linear combina-
tions (for example, selections) of the state variables. The term-structure model implies coeﬃcients
an and bn that describe yields as aﬃne functions of the factors. Cross-equation restrictions need to
be imposed on the matrices in (10)-(13) to ensure that the term-structure factors are Markov and
that yields in ht are consistent with the term-structure model.
We distinguish two types of state variables and observables. The ﬁrst Y state variables are
term structure factors s
y
t that are each identiﬁed (up to a constant) with a particular yield or
yield spread, with the latter collected in the ﬁrst Y components h
y
t of ht. In particular, the ﬁrst
component of ht is always the short interest rate i
(1)
t and the ﬁrst state variable is the demeaned
short interest rate, that is, st,1 = i
(1)
t − μ1. The other S − Y state variables zo
t are expected values
of macro variables ho
t; they drive the remaining F − Y term structure factors. We can rewrite the






















































































where IN is an identity matrix of size N.T h e ﬁrst Y state equations are copies of the ﬁrst Y
observation equations, up to the constant vector μy. In addition, the restrictions imply that et is
the forecast error on a forecast of the observables ht given all past observables (hτ)τ<t.
To ensure that the term-structure factors are Markov, we assume that there exists an F × F
matrix φf, such that ηfφs = φfηf. The vector ft can then be represented as an AR(1) process
even if S>F:
ft = ηfst = ηfφsst−1 + ηfσset
= φfηfst−1 + ηfσset
= φfft−1 + σfet. (14)
The general structure allows for F − Y term structure factors that are linear combinations of
forecasts of macro variables. For example, the matrix ηo could be a selection matrix that makes
expected inﬂation a term-structure factor. Importantly, expected inﬂation can be a term-structure
factor even if inﬂation itself cannot be represented as a component of the AR(1) process zt.
The general structure nests two useful special cases. The ﬁrst assumes that all term-structure
factors can be identiﬁed with yields or spreads, that is, F = Y and ηf =( IY , 0).T h e M a r k o v
restriction is then φy =( φf, 0) for some Y × Y matrix φf. In other words, macro variables are
assumed to not help forecasts yields, given the information in the factors z
y
t .W ea l s oh a v eσf =( IY ,
0),s ot h a tσf simply picks out the ﬁrst two components of et. The second special case assumes
18that all forecasts of macro variables included in the system are themselves term structure factors,
that is, F = S and ηf = IS. The Markov restriction is then simply φs = φf for some S ×S matrix
φf,w h i c hi sa l w a y ss a t i s ﬁed.
Term-structure coeﬃcients
We assume that there are no arbitrage opportunities in bond markets. As a result, there exists a
“risk neutral” probability Qunder which bond prices are discounted present values of bond payoﬀs.











with terminal condition P
(0)
t =1 .
We specify the Radon-Nikodym derivative ξ
Q
t of the risk neutral probability Q with respect to




















where λt is an F-vector. Since the innovations to the factors σfet are normal with variance σfΩσ0
f
under the objective probability P, ξ
Q
t is a martingale under P. The vector λt contains the “market
prices of risk” associated with the innovations σfet+1 to the term-structure factors. Indeed, the
(log) expected excess returns at date t on a set of assets with payoﬀs proportional to exp(σfet+1)
is equal to σfΩσ0
fλt. For the purpose of pricing bonds, it is suﬃcient to specify market prices of
risk for shocks to term-structure factors. At the same time, we are not ruling out that agents worry
about other shocks as well.
We assume that risk premia are linear in the term-structure factors, that is,
λt = l0 + l1ft,
for some F × 1 vector l0 and some F × F matrix l1. Standard calculations then deliver that bond




























where An is a scalar and Bn is an F × 1 vector of coeﬃcients that depend on maturity n.
The recursion for bond prices implies that the coeﬃcients are computed from the diﬀerence
equations












¢0 Bn − e1
where e1 is the ﬁrst unit vector of length F and initial conditions are given by A0 =0and B0 =0 F×1.
The coeﬃcients for the short (one-period) bond are thus A1 = −μ1 and B1 = −e1. Given these




t /n are also linear functions of the factors
with the coeﬃcients an = −An/n and bn = −Bn/n that appear in equation (13).
From objective to subjective beliefs
We assume that investors’ belief has the same basic structure as our time series model. Investors
also have in mind a state space representation of ht and an aﬃne term structure model for the yields
y
(n)
t . Moreover, they recognize the deterministic relationship between term structure factors and
yields; in other words, their model of yields also involves the risk neutral measure Q used to price
bonds above. However, investors’ subjective distribution of the state variables need not be the
same as the distribution of these variables under the objective probability P.
To deﬁne investors’ subjective beliefs, we represent the Radon-Nikodym derivative of investors’
subjective belief P∗ with respect to the objective probability P by a stochastic process ξ∗


















Since et is normal with variance Ω under the objective probability P, ξ∗
t is a martingale under P.
20Since et is the error in forecasting ht, the process κt can be interpreted as investors’ bias in their
forecast of ht. Like the risk premia λt above, the forecast bias is aﬃne in state variables, that is
κt = k0 + k1st.
Standard calculations now deliver that the dynamics of ht and yields under P∗ can be repre-
sented by
ht = μ − Ωk0 +( ηh − Ωk1)st−1 + e∗
t (16)
st = −σsΩk0 +( φs − σ0
sΩk1)st−1 + σse∗
t, (17)
ft = ηfst (18)
i
(n)
t = an + b0
nft,n =1 ,2,...., (19)
where e∗
t is i.i.d. mean-zero normal with covariance matrix Ω. The vector k0 thus aﬀects investors’
subjective mean of ht and also the state variables st, whereas the matrix k1 determines how their
forecasts of h deviate from the objective forecasts as a function of the state st. Since investors use
the same risk neutral probability Q to prices bonds, the equations for interest rates (19) involve
t h es a m ec o e ﬃcients as in (13).
We further impose restrictions such that the term-structure factors can be represented as an
AR(1) process under P∗:
ft = −ηfσsΩk0 + ηf(φs − σ0
sΩk1)st−1 + ηfσse∗
t






Since investors price assets under the risk-neutral measure Q, but their belief is P∗ rather than P,
their subjective market prices of risk are in general not equal to λt. Instead, we impose restrictions
such that there is a market price of risk process λ∗
t = λt + κ
f
t , so that the bond prices computed































We have empirically implemented two versions of the general model (10)-(13). In both cases, a
period is a quarter, and there are S =4observables ht: the 1 quarter interest rate, the spread
between the 5 year and the 1 quarter rate, inﬂation, and consumption growth. The “2 factor
system” uses only the short rate and the spread as term structure factors, that is, F = Y =2 .
Under the “4-factor system”, expected inﬂation and expected consumption growth are also factors
(S = F =4 ). In what follows, we report detailed results for the two factor model. The main
message is similar for the four factor model.
Data
We use the data on zero-coupon interest rates and survey forecasts described in detail in section
III. Moreover, we use quarterly data on nondurables and service consumption and inﬂation mea-
sured by the Personal Consumption deﬂator obtained from the NIPA tables. The sample consists
of end-of-quarter observations for 1952:2 - 2004:3 (which will be the sample for our positions data.)
Estimation
Estimation of the 2-factor model proceeds in four steps. First, we set μy equal to the sample
mean of h
y
t and ﬁnd the parameters φf and var(σfet) that govern the VAR for the term structure
factors (14) using standard SUR. Second, we estimate the parameters l0 and l1 that describe the
objective risk premia, given the VAR estimates from the ﬁrst stage. This is done by minimizing
the sum of squared ﬁtting errors for a set of yields, subject to the constraint that the 1 quarter and
5 year rates are matched exactly.
The third step is to estimate the full system. Here we use information already gained from the
term structure estimation in the ﬁrst step: since Y = F =2 ,w eh a v et h a tφy =( φf, 0) as well as
σf =( I2, 0), which implies that var(σfet) is the top left 2×2 submatrix of Ω.T h eﬁrst step thus
already delivers estimates for the ﬁrst two rows of the matrices φs and ηs, and for three elements in
Ω. We estimate the remaining 23 parameters of the full system (10)-(11) by maximum likelihood
holding the term-structure parameters already estimated in step 1 ﬁxed at their estimated values.
This step also produces a sequence of estimates (ˆ st) for the realized values of the state variables st.
22The fourth step is to estimate the parameters k0 and k1 that govern the Radon-Nikodym
derivative (15) of the subjective belief. The current implementation of the model uses only interest
rate forecasts (and not yet survey forecast data on inﬂation and growth.) It thus restricts attention
to biases to the term structure factors. In particular, we let k0
0 =( k
f0
0 0) for a 2 × 1 vector k
f
0 and
let k1 consists of all zeros, except a 2 × 2 matrix k
f
1 in the top left corner. We estimate these six
parameters by minimizing an objective function that penalizes diﬀerences between model-implied
subjective forecasts and survey forecasts. This step is thus technically similar to the estimation of
risk premia l0 and l1 under the objective probability in step 2.
In particular, we select forecast horizons of 1 quarter and 1 year, as well as yields of maturity 1
quarter, 1 year and 10 years. Consider some date where we have a survey forecast of some yield over
some horizon. Given parameters k0 and k1, as well as the parameter and state variable estimates
from step 3, we can ﬁnd the forecast of that yield, for that date and horizon, under the subjective
belief P∗. The objective function now sums up diﬀerences between survey forecasts and model-
implied subjective forecasts for every date, yield and horizon. It also adds, for every date and for
the same forecast horizons, diﬀerences between the model-implied subjective forecasts of inﬂation
and consumption growth and the model-implied objective forecasts of inﬂation and consumption
growth. The presence of these last terms implies that the estimation cannot distort the macro
forecasts “too much” in order to ﬁt the interest rate forecasts.
Term structure dynamics
Panel A in Table 2 reports parameter estimates.7 The estimated dynamics of the factors
are highly persistent; the eigenvalues of the matrix φf are 0.96 and 0.75. The two factors are
contemporaneously negatively correlated and the spread is negatively correlated with the short
rate lagged less than year, and positively correlated with longer lags of the short rate. The short
rate is negatively correlated with the spread lagged less than three years, with weak correlation for
longer lags.
The parameter estimates of l0 and l1 govern the behavior of the conditional Sharpe ratio −λt
(mean excess return divided by standard deviation) on long bonds. Since the standard deviation
7This draft does not yet report standard errors. Standard errors can be computed by GMM, taking into account
the multi-step nature of the estimation.
23of excess returns in this model is constant, and the factors ft are mean zero, the large negative
estimate of the ﬁrst l0 component indicates that expected excess returns on long bonds are positive.
The entries in l1 are negative and indicate that expected excess returns on long bonds are high in
periods with high short rate or high spreads. The dependence of expected excess returns on spreads
captures that model-implied expected excess returns are countercyclical.
Table 2: Estimation of Term Structure Model
Panel A: Parameter Estimates
φf σfΩ
1





0.952 0.108 0.248 0 −0.218 -21.2 −55.8
0.016 0.758 -0.126 0.114 0.033 -4.4 −115.9
Panel B: Fitting errors for bond yields (annualized)
maturity (in quarters)
1 qtr 4 qrts 20 qrts 40 qrts 60 qrts 80 qrts
mean absolute errors (in %) 0 0.26 0 0.23 0.37 .46
Panel B reports by how much the model-implied yields diﬀer from observed yields on average.
By construction, the model hits the 1-quarter and 5-year interest rates exactly, because these rates
are included as factors. For intermediate maturities, the error lies within the .23 — .46 percent
range. We will see below that these errors are suﬃciently small for our purposes.
Subjective vs. objective dynamics
Table 3 reports estimation results for the change of measure from the objective to the subjective
belief. For the two factor model, we estimate 6 parameters, two in k0 and four in k1. Rather than
report these estimates directly, Panel A of the table shows the implied factor dynamics and market
prices of risk of the investor’s subjective term structure model. The market price of risk λ∗
t = λt−κt
have been premultiplied by the volatility matrix Ω
1
2σ0
f from Table 2 to make them comparable to
the market prices of risk in the earlier table. Panel B reports mean absolute distances between
the survey forecasts and model-implied forecasts, for both the subjective belief and the objective
24statistical model. Comparison of these errors provides a measure of how well the change of measure
works to capture the deviation of survey forecasts from statistical forecasts.





































Figure 2: The top panel shows one-year ahead forecasts of the 10-year zero coupon rate constructed
from survey data in Section III, together with the corresponding forecasts from our objective and
subjective models. The bottom panel shows the diﬀerence between the survey forecast and the
objective model forecast, as well as the diﬀerence between the subjective and objective model
forecasts.
The results show that the improvement is small for short-horizon forecasts of short yields.
However, there is a marked reduction of errors for 1-year forecasts, especially for the 10-year bond.
Figure 2 shows where the improvements in matching the long-bond forecasts come from. The top
panel shows one-year ahead forecasts of the 10-year zero coupon rate constructed from survey data
in Section III, together with the corresponding forecasts from our objective and subjective models,
25for the sam,ple 1982:4-2004:3. All forecasts track the actual 10-year rate over this period, which
is natural given the persistence of interest rates. The largest discrepancies between the survey
forecasts and the subjective model on the one hand, and the objective model on the other hand,
occur during and after the recessions of 1990 and 2001. In both periods, the objective model quickly
forecasts a drop in the interest rate, whereas investors did not actually expect such a drop. The
subjective model captures this property.
For our asset pricing application, we are particularly interested in how well the subjective model
captures deviations of survey forecasts of long interest rates from their statistical forecasts over the
business cycle. As discussed in Section III, this forecast diﬀerence is closely related to measured
expected excess returns. The bottom panel of the ﬁgure focuses again on forecasting a 10-year rate
over one year, and plots the diﬀerence between the survey forecast and the objective model forecast,
as well as the diﬀerence between the subjective and objective model forecasts. It is apparent that
both forecast diﬀerences move closely together at business cycle frequencies, increasing during and
after recessions. We thus conclude that the subjective model is useful to capture this key fact about
subjective forecasts that matters for asset pricing.
Table 3: Estimation of Subjective Belief












.002 .996 .129 −0.145 -3.4 −47.1
-.001 -.044 .887 0.043 -37.4 5.8
Panel B: Mean absolute ﬁtting errors for yield forecasts (% p.a.)
subjective model objective model
maturity of forecasted yield in quarters in quarters
forecast horizon 1q t r 4q r t s 8 0q r t s 1 qtr 4 qtrs 80 qtr
1q u a r t e r 0.19 0.37 0.35 0.19 0.40 0.36
1y e a r 0.25 0.36 0.34 0.29 0.47 0.58
26The parameter estimates in Table 3 also show that investors’ forecasts are on average very
close to the forecasts from our statistical model: the unconditional means of the factors under P∗
are very small. At the same time, the factors are more persistent under P∗; in particular, other
things equal, a one-percent increase in the spread increases the forecast of the spread next period
by .88%, as opposed to .75% under the statistical model. The estimated market prices of risk
show that the investor requires less compensation for short rate risk than what is suggested by the
statistical model: the Sharpe ratio on an asset with payoﬀ proportional to the future price of a
short bond drops to .14 from .21 under the statistical model. Moreover, there is less time variation
of risk premia than under the statistical model. In particular, as the spread plays a larger role in
forecasting future spreads, it plays a smaller role in moving around risk premia for spread shocks.
V Bond positions
In this section, we use the (subjective) term structure model estimated in the previous section
to represent the universe of bonds available to investors in terms of a small number of “spanning
bonds”. In subsection A., we construct, for every zero-coupon bond, a portfolio of three bonds
— a short bond and two long bonds — that replicates closely the return on the given zero-coupon
bond. In subsection B., we then show how statistics on bond positions in the US economy can be
converted into a time series of positions in the three bonds.
A. Replicating Zero Coupon Bonds
According to the term structure model, the price P
(n)
t of a zero coupon bond of maturity n at
date t is well described by exp(An + B0
nft). We now select N long bonds, zero-coupon bonds with
maturity greater than one, and stack their coeﬃcients in a vector b a and a matrix b b. Our goal is
to construct a portfolio containing the long bonds and the short bond such that the return on the
portfolio replicates closely the return on any other zero-coupon bond with maturity n.W eu s ea
discretization of continuous time returns, similar to those used above for the return on wealth. We
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Conditional on date t, we thus view the change in value of the bond as an aﬃne function in
the shocks to the factors σfε∗
t+1. Its distribution is described by N +1time-dependent coeﬃcients:
the constant a
(n)
t and the loadings b
(n)








for the short bond, and we can arrange coeﬃcients for the N long bonds in a vector ˆ at
and a matrix ˆ bt. Now consider a portfolio that contains θ1 units of the short bond and ˆ θi units
of the ith long bond. The change in value of this portfolio is also an aﬃne function in the factor










































Since the (N +1 )×(N +1 )matrix of coeﬃcient on the left hand side is invertible for a nondegener-




to make the conditional distribution
of the value change in the portfolio equal to that of the bond.
Replicating portfolios based on a two-factor model




, the replicating portfolio for the n-period bond
answers the question: how many spanning bonds are equivalent to one n-period bond? For our work
b e l o wi ti sm o r ec o n v e n i e n tt od e ﬁne portfolio weights that answer the question: how many dollars
worth of spanning bonds are equivalent to one dollar worth of invested in the n-period bonds? The




and the prices of spanning bonds.
Figure 3 provides the answer computed from the two-factor term structure model estimated above.
Since the term structure model is stationary, these weights do not depend on calendar time.













Figure 3: Replicating portfolios; the maturity in quarters of the bond to be replicated is measured
along the x-axis.
The maturity of the n-period bond to be replicated is measured along the horizontal axis. The




t on the diﬀerent spanning bonds i; they sum to
one for every maturity n. As spanning bonds i, we have selected the 1-,8- and 20-quarter bonds.
For simplicity, we refer to the long spanning bonds as the middle and the long bond, respectively.
The ﬁgure shows that the spanning bonds are replicated exactly by portfolio weights of one on
themselves. More generally, the replicating portfolios for the most average neighboring bonds.
For example, most of the bonds with maturities in between the 1-quarter and 8-quarter bond are
generating by simply mixing these two bonds, although there is also a small short position in the
long bond. Similarly, most of the bonds with maturities in between the middle and long bond
are generating by mixing those two bonds. Intuitively, mixing of two bonds will lead to expected
29returns that are linear in maturity, whereas adding a third bond helps generate curvature.
Quality of the approximation
We now provide some evidence that the approximation of a zero-coupon bond by a portfolio of
spanning bonds is decent for our purposes. There are two dimensions along which we would like to
obtain a good approximation. First, we would like the value of the approximating portfolio to be
the same as the value of the zero-coupon bond. This is relevant for measuring the supply of bonds:
b e l o ww ew i l lt a k ee x i s t i n gm e a s u r e so ft h eq u a n t i ty of zero-coupon-bonds held by households and
convert them into portfolios of the small number of spanning bonds that are tradable by agents in
our model. Along this dimension, the approximation is essentially as good as the term structure
model itself. For a replicating portfolio deﬁned by (21), the portfolio value e−itθ1 + ˆ P0
tˆ θ diﬀers
from the bond value P
(n)
t only to the extent that the term structure model does not ﬁt bonds of
maturity n. The additional approximation error introduced by the matching procedure is less than
.0001 basis points.
Second, we would like the conditional distribution of bond returns to be the same as that of
the portfolio return. This is important because we would like agents in our model to have bond
investment opportunity sets that are similar to those of actual households who trade bonds of many
more maturities. Figure 4 gives an idea about the goodness of the approximation (21) by comparing
statistics of the actual return implied by the term structure model and the approximating return.
All statistics are unconditional moments computed from our sample, using the realizations of the
term structure factors. For example, to obtain the diﬀerence in means in the top panel, we compute
(i) quarterly returns from the term structure model using the formula exp(An + B0
nft) for prices,
and (ii) quarterly returns based on the approximate formula for price changes (20) and subtract
the mean of (i) from the mean of (ii).
On average, the two return distributions are quite similar for all maturities. The mean returns
diﬀer by less than 10 basis points for all bonds shorter than 30 years. The diﬀerence in variance is
at most 30 basis points. The approximation error increases with maturity, as do the mean return
and the variance of returns themselves. The appro x i m a t em e a nr e t u r no nb o n d si sa l w a y sw i t h i n
5% of the true mean return, while the approximate variance is within 5-15% of the true variance.









Difference in correlation with shocks
maturity in quarters
innovation to first factor
innovation to second factor













Figure 4: Approximation errors
Larger errors tend to arise for longer bonds. In addition to the univariate distribution of a return,
it is also of interest how it covaries with other returns. If the term structure model is correct, then
a parsimonious way to check this is to consider the correlation with the two factor innovations.
The lower panel of the ﬁgure reports the diﬀerence between the correlation coeﬃcients of the true
and approximate returns with the factor innovations. These diﬀerences are very small.
B. Replicating nominal instruments in the US economy
We now turn to more complicated ﬁxed-income instruments. The Flow-of-Funds (FFA) provides
data on book value for many diﬀerent types of nominal instruments. Doepke and Schneider (2006;
DS) sort these instrument into several broad classes, and then use data on interest rates, maturities
31and contract structure to construct, for every asset class and every date t, a certain net payment
stream that the holders of the asset expect to receive in the future. Their procedure takes into
account credit risk in instruments such as corporate bonds and mortgages. They use these payment
streams to restate FFA positions at market value and assess the eﬀect of changes in inﬂation
expectations on wealth.
Here we determine, for every broad asset class, a replicating portfolio that consists of spanning
bonds. For every asset class and every date t, DS provide a certain payment stream, which we can
view as a portfolio of zero-coupon bonds. By applying equation (21) to every zero-coupon bond,
and then summing up the resulting replicating portfolios across maturities, we obtain a replicating
portfolio for the asset class at date t. Figure 5 illustrates replicating portfolios for Treasury bonds
and mortgages. The top panel shows how the weights on the spanning bonds in the replicating
portfolio for Treasury bonds have changed over the postwar period.
The reduction of government debt after the war went along with a shortening of maturities:
the weight on the longest bond declined from over 60% in 1952 to less than 20% in 1980. This
development has been somewhat reversed since 1980.8 The bottom panel shows that the eﬀective
maturity composition of mortgages was very stable before the 1980s, with a high weight on long
bonds. The changes that apparent since the 1980s are driven by the increased use of adjustable
rate mortgages.
We do not show replicating portfolios for Treasury bills, municipal bonds and corporate bonds,
since the portfolio weights exhibit few interesting changes over time. All three instruments are
represented by essentially constant portfolios of only two bonds: T-bills correspond to about 80%
short bonds and 20% middle bonds, that for corporate bonds corresponds to about 60% middle
bonds and 40% long bonds, and the replicating portfolio for municipal bonds has 70% long bonds
and 30% middle bonds. The ﬁnal asset class is a mopup group of short instruments, which we
replicate by a short bond.
Replicating aggregate FFA household sector positions
We compute measure aggregate household holdings in the FFA at date t.T o d e r i v e t h e i r
8The ﬁgure shows only the portfolios corresponding to outstanding Treasury bonds, not including bills. DS use
data from the CRSP Treasury data base to construct a separate series for bills.
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Figure 5: Replicating weights for Treasury bonds and mortgages
positions in spanning bonds, we compute replicating portfolios for household positions in the FFA.
One important issue is how to deal with indirect bond positions, such as bonds held in a pension
plan or bonds held by a mutual fund, the shares in which are owned by the household sector. Here
we make use of the calculations in DS who consolidate investment intermediaries in the FFA to
arrive at eﬀective bond positions.
Applying the replicating portfolios for the broad asset classes to FFA household sector positions
delivers three time series for holdings in spanning bonds, which are plotted in Figure 6. It is
apparent that the early 1980s brought about dramatic changes in US bond portfolios. Until then,
the positions in short bonds had been trending slightly upwards, whereas the positions in long and
middle bonds had been declining. This pattern was reversed during the 1980s and early 1990s. The
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Figure 6: US household sector positions in the bond market
increase in the share of long bonds was partly due to changes in the composition of Treasury debt,
as seen in Figure 5.
34VI Interest Rates
In this section, we report numerical results for model implied yields for the rentier model.
A. The rentier model
The starting point for the rentier exercise is a series of bond portfolio holdings. We consider an
investor who invests only in bonds, and whose holdings are proportional to the given series of
holdings. Since we do not observe the consumption of these bond investors, we do not allow for
a residual asset, take the short rate as exogenous and only derive model-implied long bond prices.
The idea behind the exercise is to explore what risk premia look like if there is a subset of investors
for whom bonds are very important. As for the series of holdings, we have used US households’
holdings of Treasury bonds, their holdings of all nominal assets except deposits, as well as US
households’ net position of nominal assets. The main lessons have been similar for all cases. In
what follows, we report only the results for the total net position.
Formally, the input to the rentier exercise is a sequence of portfolio weights ˆ αt that represents
the class of bonds considered in terms of our spanning bonds, a sequence of observed short-term
interest rates, as well as a sequence of beliefs Gt a b o u tf u t u r ei n t e r e s tr a t e sa n di n ﬂation that is
needed to solve the portfolio choice problem. The sequence of beliefs Gt about future interest rates
and inﬂation is a sequence of conditionals from the subjective probability distribution over yields
and inﬂation estimated in subsection B..
Returns and preference parameters
The subjective state space system (16)-(19) together with the formulas for yields from the term
structure model implies a VAR in (i) the real return on the short bond, (ii) excess returns on the
middle and long bonds and (iii) the state variables zt. This VAR is the basis for our portfolio choice
problem, and allows us to use the approximation method of Campbell et al., as discussed in Section
II. Given a solution for the portfolio demand, we then use equation (7) to derive a sequence of
model-implied long bond prices.
35Table 4: Subjective Moments of Excess Returns (% p.a.)
excess returns (%) middle bond long bond
mean .64 .48
cond. standard deviation 2.68 12.72
cond. correlation matrix 1 .83
.1
correlation with short bond -.17 .07
The short bond has a subjective mean real return 1.76% and one-quarter-ahead conditional
volatility 0.56% in annualized percentage terms. Table 4 summarizes relevant moments of the
subjective distribution of quarterly excess returns implied by the model for the middle and long
spanning bonds (which 2 and 10 year maturities.) In terms of conditional Sharpe ratios (mean
excess return divided by standard deviation), the middle bonds looks subjectively more attractive
than the long bond. It is also notable that the long and middle bond returns are highly positively
correlated. No longer bond covaries much with the short bond return.
There is a role for market timing because of the predictability of excess long bond returns.
This is illustrated in Figure 7. The light gray lines in both panels are the subjective expected
excess returns under the subjective model. They exhibit both a low frequency movement — long
bonds were less attractive in the beginning of the sample and again recently — and a business cycle
component — expected excess returns tend to tick up during and after recessions. For comparison,
the ﬁgure also plots expected excess returns under the objective model. Interestingly, business
cycle swings in expected excess returns are much smaller under the subjective model. This reﬂects
the diﬀerence in market prices of risk for the two models discussed above. Under the subjective
model, the yield is more persistent, and does not drive risk premia to the extent it does under the


























































Figure 7: Expected excess holding period returns over one quarter, for the 2 year bond (top panel)
and the 10 year bond (bottom panel), under the objective anmd subjective models, in annualized
percent.
objective model. As a result, investors perceive less opportunities for bond market timing than if
their belief was given by the objective.
37Mean term premia and yield volatility
Table 5 reports means and standard deviations for three sets of parameters. As a benchmark,
we include a log investor (γ =1 ) . In this case, the mean long rate is matched up to 4 basis points,
while the mean short rate is matched up to 21 basis points. By equation (7), the log investor
model shuts down any time variation in subjective risk premia due to changes in changes in future
investment opportunities. In addition, risk aversion is small, so that subjective consumption risk
premia measured via bond portfolio weights are essentially zero. The model nevertheless generates
positive term premia, because prices reﬂect investors’ subjective expectations of future payoﬀs. For
the same reason, model implied yield are almost as volatile as those in the data.
Table 5: Moments of Equilibrium Yields
nominal yields (% p.a.) short bond middle bond long bond
Data mean 5.27 5.90 6.53
std. dev. 1.47 1.45 1.33
Log utility mean 5.69 6.57
std. dev. 1.37 1.28
γ =2 ,β= .97 mean 5.67 6.53
std. dev. 1.34 1.25
γ =2 0 ,β= .8 mean 5.67 6.53
std. dev. 1.32 1.23
We have searched over a grid of values for β and γ in order to ﬁnd values that match exactly
the mean excess returns on the two yields. It turns out that such a pair of values does not exist
for γ<200. This is somewhat surprising, since the parameters β and γ do have diﬀerent eﬀects on
portfolio demand. In particular, risk aversion γ lowers the myopic demand for bonds, but increases
the hedging demand for assets that provide insurance against bad future investment opportunities.
38In contrast, the discount factor aﬀects only the size of the hedging demand. However, it appears
that the myopic and hedging demands for the two bonds react to both parameters in a similar way,
so that they cannot be identiﬁed from the two average premia. In fact, the mean spread between
the long and middle bond reacts very little to changes in β and γ. The reason is that it is due
in part to systematic diﬀerences in payoﬀ expectations between the two bonds (induced by the
subjective model), which aﬀect prices independently of the risk premium terms that are responsive
to γ and β.
We report results for two other values of the risk aversion coeﬃcient, in each case choosing the
discount factor to match the mean long rate. Our leading example, to be explored further below,
is the case γ =2 , a common choice for risk aversion in macro models; matching the long rate then
requires β = .97. The resulting summary statistics are quite close to the log investor case. Relative
to the log case, the mean long rate falls, even though risk aversion has gone up. This is because
a patient investor can hold the long bond to hedge against bad investment opportunities, that is,
low future short interest rates. This reduces the required compensation for risk. The table also
provides a high risk aversion example: for γ =2 0 ,w em u s tp i c kβ = .8. As risk aversion increases,
the desire to hedge becomes stronger which by itself would increase the demand for the long bond
and lower the long rate. The reduction in β weakens the hedging motive to keep the mean long
rate at its observed value. This tradeoﬀ says that if high risk aversion of rentiers is to be consistent
with yield spreads in the data, then the eﬀective planning horizon of the rentier must be shorter
than that of the typical RBC agent.
Model-implied yield spreads
Figure 8 plots yield spreads from the data together with yield spreads implied by the model
for the case γ =2 , β = .97. The middle panel shows that the model matches the 10-year spread
quite well. The top and bottom panel show the two-year spread, as well as the spread of the ten
year rate over the two year rate, respectively. Both panels reﬂects the fact that the mean 2-year
rate is lower in the model than in the data. At the same time, the changes in model-implied and
observed spreads track each other rather closely. The dynamics of spreads is driven in part by
expectations of future yields. It is interesting to ask whether the model implied yields exhibit the
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Figure 8: Yield spreads (as % p.a.) for the data sample (light lines) and the model-implied sample
(dark lines).
same movements relative to statistical expected future yields as do their counterparts in the data.
This is done in Figure 9, which reports risk premia relative to the expectations hypothesis for the
10 year yield.
All three lines in the ﬁgure represent the diﬀerence between a 10-year yield and its expectations























t+1 is the 1-quarter excess holding period return on the n-period bond. In other words,
40the lines show the diﬀerence between the forward rate on a contract that promises an (n − 1)-
period bond one period from date t. The three lines diﬀer in what forward rate is used, and how
the expectation is formed. The light gray line labelled “data — obj. EH” shows the diﬀerence
between the forward rate from the data and the expected rate under the objective probability. It
is thus proportional to measured expected excess returns, which tend to be high during and after
recessions.






Risk premia (maturity 40 quarters, percent)
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Figure 9: Risk premia (actual yield minus yield predicted under the expectations hypothesis) for
(i) the data sample using predictions from the objective modol (light gray), (ii) the model implied
sample using predictions from the subjective model (black), and (iii) the model implied sample
using predicitions from the subjective model.
The black line represents a model implied objective risk premium — the diﬀerence between
the forward rate implied by the model and the expected rate under the objective probability. It
exhibits both a low frequency component and a business cycle component that comoves with the
risk premium from the data. To illustrate the source of these movements, the dark gray line
41shows the subjective risk premium that is, the diﬀerence between the forward rate implied by the
model and the expected rate under the subjective probability. The subjective premium looks like a
smoothed version of the objective premium. It follows that the business cycle frequency movements
in the objective risk premium have little to do with the subjective risk premium as perceived by
investors. Instead, those movements are due to the diﬀerences between subjective and objective
forecasts documented in Sections III.
Investors’ subjective perception of risk is reﬂected in the subjective risk premium, and is also
responsible for the low frequency components in the model implied objective risk premium. By
equation (7), changes in the subjective premium must be due to changes in hedging opportunities
or changes in bond positions. At the current parameter values, risk aversion is low and changes in
positions do not have large eﬀects. Instead, the V-shaped pattern in the subjective risk premium
is due to changes in the covariance between long bond returns and future continuation utility.
Intuitively, the insurance that long bonds provide to long horizon investors against drops in future
short rates became more valuable in the 1980s when short rates were high. As a result, the
compensation required for holding such bonds declined.
To explore the role of changes in bond positions, the dark gray line in Figure 10 shows the
parts γΣˆ xˆ x b Bt/Bt of the model-implied subjective risk premia for the 2-year and 10-year bonds that
are due to changes in positions. This compensation for risk is small and also moves slowly, at
similar frequencies as the portfolio weights derived in Section 6. For comparison, the ﬁgure also
shows, at diﬀerent scales, low frequency components of the respective term spreads that have been
extracted using a band-pass ﬁlter. The increase in the spread in the 1980s thus went along with a
shift towards longer bond positions that contributed positively to risk premia. However, the drop
in subjective risk premia before 1980s did not go along with movements in the spread.
The quantitative lessons of this section are conﬁrmed when we start the exercise from other
classes of bond portfolios. Matching the long interest rate under the subjective model point us to
small risk aversion coeﬃcients, which in turn make the contribution of subjective risk premia, and
especially the part due to bond positions, is quantitatively small. A qualitative diﬀerence is that
when we eliminate deposits and liabilities from the portfolio, the middle and long bonds become
relatively more important, and there is some evidence of business cycle variation in the model
42implied subjective risk premia. This suggests that a diﬀerent model of conditional variance might
lead to a larger role for subjective risk premia measured via bond positions.
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Figure 10: Trend in the term spread constructed with bandpass ﬁlter (light line, left scale) and
model-implied risk premium (dark line, right scale).
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45AA p p e n d i x
The goal of this appendix is to describe an equilibrium model of the US economy. The equations
about optimal behavior and model-implied prices described in the body of the paper (for the case
with a residual asset) hold in this equilibrium model. The model goes beyond these equations
because it (i) derives initial wealth of households as the (endogenous) value of exogenous quantities
of asset endowments and (ii) and speciﬁes trades between US households and other sectors of the
economy, such as foreigners. The households in the model optimize for some given exogenous
expectations. This speciﬁcation allows expectations to be consistent with survey evidence or with
some learning mechanism.
The model describes a single trading period t. In each period, the US household sector trades
assets with another sector of the economy. We call the other sector the “rest of the economy”
(ROE), which stands in for the government, business, and foreign sectors. Households enter the
trading period t endowed with one unit of the residual asset. Their initial wealth Wt also comprises
dividends from the residual asset as well as the value of all bonds written on the rest of the economy
that households bought at date t − 1, denoted ¯ Bt:
(A-1) Wt =: Pres
t + Dt + ¯ Bt.
Households decide how to split this initial wealth into consumption as well as investment in the
N+2assets. More speciﬁcally, the household problem at date t is to maximize utility (1) subject to
the budget constraint (2), given initial wealth ¯ Wt as well as beliefs about (a conditional distribution
of) the relevant future price variables
¡
xres
τ ,i τ,πτ, ˆ pτ, ˆ p+1
τ
¢
τ>t: the excess return on the residual
asset, the short interest rate, the inﬂation rate and the prices and payoﬀs on the long spanning
bonds.
The trading strategy of the rest of the economy is exogenous. In particular, at date t the ROE
sector sells residual assets worth Presft. This trade captures, for example, the construction of
new houses, and the net issuance of new equity. The ROE also trades in the bond market. It is
convenient to summarize bond trades in terms of the value of outstanding bonds written on the
46ROE. At date t, the ROE redeems all short bonds issued at date t − 1, and it also buys back all
outstanding long bonds, at a total cost of ¯ B. Moreover, the ROE issues new bonds worth Bt,s o
that its net sale of bonds is Bt − ¯ Bt, which could be positive or negative.
To deﬁne new issues of individual bonds, we collect the values of new long bonds in a vector
b Bt. The value of outstanding short bonds is then Bt − ι0
t b B,w h e r eι is an N-vector of ones. The
ROE trading strategy is thus set up so that the same set of N +1types of bonds — namely the
short bond and the long bonds — are held by households at the end of every trading period. For
example, suppose that the only long bond is a zero-coupon bond with a maturity of n periods.
Between dates t − 1 and t, households can then hold short (1-period) and long (n-period) bonds.
At date t, the ROE buys back all long bonds (which now have maturity n − 1), and again issues
new 1-period short and n-period long bonds, and so on.
Equilibrium
We solve for a sequence of temporary equilibria. For each trading date t,w et a k ea sg i v e n(i)
the strategy of the rest of the economy, summarized by its asset trades
³
Presft, ¯ Bt,B t, b Bt
´
, (ii)
dividends Dt on the residual asset earned by households and (iii) household expectations about
(that is, the conditional distribution of) the relevant price variables
¡
rres
τ ,i τ,πτ, ˆ pτ, ˆ p+1
τ
¢
τ>t,w h i c h
comprise the return on the residual asset, the short interest rate, the inﬂation rate and the prices
and payoﬀs on the long bonds for all future periods. We characterize equilibrium prices as functions
of these three inputs by equating household asset demand to the net asset supply provided by the
trading strategy of the ROE.
Formally, an equilibrium consists of sequences of short interest rates and (log) long bond prices
(it, ˆ pt) as well as optimal choices by households (Ct,α res














Wt − Ct = Bt + Pres
t + Presft (A-2)
47Here the ﬁrst equation clears the market for the residual asset, the second equation clears the
markets for the long bonds and the last equation ensures that total savings equals the total value
of outstanding assets, which implies that the market for short bonds also clears. This system of
N +2equations determines the N +2asset prices (Pres
t ,i t, ˆ pt). While the price of the residual
asset Pres
t appears directly in (A-2), bond prices enter via the eﬀect of bond returns on portfolio
demand.
A sequence of temporary equilibria imposes weaker restrictions on allocations and prices than
a standard rational expectations equilibrium. In particular, the deﬁnition above does not directly
connect what happens at diﬀerent trading periods. On the one hand, we do not require that the




of payoﬀs from bonds bought earlier is an exogenous input to the model. On the other
hand, we do not impose conditions relating return expectations at date t to model-implied realized
(or expected) returns in future periods, as one would do when imposing rational expectations.
At the same time, if there is a rational expectations equilibrium of our model that accounts for
observed asset prices and household sector choices, then it also gives rise to a sequence of temporary
equilibria.
The fact that our model allows for trades between the household sector and the rest of the
economy distinguishes it from the endowment economies frequently studies in the asset pricing
literature. In particular, our model accommodates nonzero personal savings. Combining (A-1) and
the last equation in (A-2), we obtain the ﬂow-of-funds identity
(A-3) Ct + Presft +
¡
Bt − ¯ Bt
¢
= Dt.
The dividend on the residual asset Dt corresponds to personal income less net personal interest
income. As a result, Dt−Ct is personal savings less net interest. It consists of Presft — net purchases
of all assets other than bonds — and Bt − ¯ Bt — net purchases of bonds less net interest. A typical
endowment economy model of the type studied by Lucas (1978) instead assumes that bonds are in
zero net supply and that household net wealth is a claim on future consumption, so that Ct = Dt
and Presft =0 .
48